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The concept of known-item search has long been central to research and
application in library and information science. It is surprising then that this
concept has received practically no systematic discussion. We survey the
various conceptual and operational characterizations of known-item search in
the LIS literature in order to determine exactly how the concept is being
understood by its users. We demonstrate that this apparently simple notion is
actually quite complex and varied, and moreover, that there is hardly a single
feature ordinarily associated with it that can confidently be said to be an
essential part of the concept.
Introduction
Researchers and theorists in the information science community have upon many
occasions called for more rigor in the basic concepts and terminology of our field.
Although interest in increased rigor may seem especially intense at present (Hjørland,
2005a), the concern is not new:
Information retrieval as a discipline stands in need of a conceptual and theoretical
framework, of an articulation of its fundamental principles, and identification of key
issues and problems. It is particularly curious, in the light of its importance in bringing
order and structure to other disciplines, that it itself has been so deficient in these
same qualities.
Don Swanson, Foreword to Principles of Information Retrieval (Kochen, 1974; p.ix)
This paper is the start of an exercise toward that end, focusing on the concept of a
known-item search. The importance of this concept to the field is manifest. It is not only
widely used in explanations, hypotheses, and theories of information seeking, but is a
stock category in the literature of bibliographic instruction. What at first appears to be a
straightforward concept is really quite complex. Sources of complexity include (i)
differences in orientation: cataloging, information retrieval, reference, information seeking
behavior studies; (ii) differences in level of discussion - the concept vs. its
operationalization in a particular system; and (iii) greater variation as the technology
supporting information retrieval has evolved.
We review the use of the concept in Library and Information Science (LIS) research and
survey previous efforts to articulate definitions in order to demonstrate the complexity and
inconsistent use of this concept. The organizing framework for the survey is an
investigation of assumptions underlying these definitions. We consider counterexamples,
boundary cases, and variations on the theme. We show that certain familiar
characterizations are problematic and explore some alternatives. In the process the
conceptual contours of this notion are identified and the options for formalization become
clearer.
Significance of the Study
“Known-item search” is one of the most widely deployed concepts in the field of library
and information science. While the dichotomous view of categorizing searches into
“known-item search” and “subject search” has been criticized by authors like Buckland
(1979), and a number of other additional types of searches have been suggested (e.g.,
“bibliographic searches” (Lipetz, 1972), “location searches” (Specht, 1980), “existence
searching”, “exploratory searching”, “comprehensive searching” (Rosenfeld & Morville,
1998), “negative searching” (Stielow & Tibbo, 1988), “unknown item searches”, “area
searches” (Slone, 2000)), the concept of a known-item search has continuously appeared
in a wide range of LIS literature for the last several decades. In catalog studies, especially
those exploring OPAC (Online Public Access Catalog) use, known-item search is often
listed as one of the two major types of searches, along with subject search (Matthews et
al., 1983). Known-item search commonly appears as a component or in an explanation of
the search modes in information seeking and retrieval models (Ellis, 1989; Broder, 2002;
McKenzie, 2003), and is a common task characterization in the evaluation of information
retrieval systems and techniques (TREC: Text REtrieval Conference) (Voorhees, 2004).
Finally, in the numerous bibliographic instructions (e.g., searching tutorials) provided for
library users on various library websites, known-item searches are typically distinguished
from subject searches or browsing, and given a specific search strategy suitable for that
type of search.
Most researchers articulate their own conceptual and operational definitions of a
known-item search, making little effort to explicitly connect these to the general concept
and rarely providing citations to sources or authorities. For the most part researchers
seem to follow their intuitions or common sense on what a known-item search is, and
then develop operational definitions that seem, again, on intuitive grounds, to be roughly
coextensive with known-item search in the particular research context they are exploring.
The result of course is that definitions and assumptions vary, and the significance and
comparability of the findings are undermined.
Operational and Conceptual Definitions of a Known-Item Search
We will now look at various characterizations of known-item search in the literature. In this
section, we provide some exemplary definitions to illustrate problems that will be explored
in more detail in the next section - Exploring the Assumptions. In what follows we assume
that there are some relatively conceptual understandings of known-item search that are
independent of the specific operational definitions designed to be used to identify
known-item searches in a particular context. We specifically want to draw the readers’
attention to the issues caused by mixed uses of operational and conceptual definitions of
the concept in the literature.
In the context of card catalogs, one particular operational definition of known-item search
seemed particularly natural and was commonly used: a search for an item for which the
author or title is known. However, the introduction of an OPAC and the Internet resulted in
the addition of numerous new access points and this definition is now inappropriately
restrictive. This is partly due to the fact that originally a known-item search had been
defined operationally with little attention to whether the operational definition in fact
matched the concept, and there was usually almost no effort to clarify the concept itself.
A catalog is the single, most important key to a library’s collections. Its major function
is to show whether the library owns a particular bibliographic item whose author
and/or title are known (known items) and, if so, where it is located. (Lancaster &
Joncich, 1977; p.19)
Here Lancaster and Joncich are probably best interpreted as saying that the catalog has a
major function supporting a search where author and title are known, and those are
known-item searches, without intending that to be a definition of known-item search. But
it is obvious that the distinction can be difficult to maintain in the context of observing and
discussing catalog use.
Searching for known items by subject is very inefficient, but can be successful when
other approaches fail. (Lewis, 1987; p.153) 
Here we see a recognition that known-item searches can be carried out by subject,
reflecting a conceptual understanding that is wider than the typical operationalization.
Most searches are of two types: a search for some item for which either the author or
title is known (called a known-item search) or a search for some item on a particular
subject (American Library Association, 1958; Hafter, 1979). (Baker & Lancaster,
1991; p.200) 
This is a typical characterization that nicely illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing
operational and conceptual definitions. The description of subject search is at a fairly
conceptual level, but the correlative characterization of known-item search appears
operational. One could understand the authors to be saying that “a search for some item
for which either the author or title is known” simply is “a known-item search” which would
exclude many searches that are commonly thought of as searches for known items, or we
could more charitably interpret this as an informative operational definition even though
the corresponding definition of subject search is conceptual. When using a subject card
catalog, this searching based on a particular subject could possibly be understood as an
operational definition as well. However, outside of the context of using the card catalog, “a
search for some item on a particular subject” can easily come across as keyword
searching, not searching under subject headings, thus understood as a conceptual
definition rather than an operational one.
Some people who approach a library catalog have a particular item in mind, and they
want to determine whether the library holds that item and where in the library it is
located. Such a person would conduct a known-item search. A known-item search
may include the author, the title, the subject, or a combination of these and other
pieces of information to identify the item in the catalog. (Wildemuth & O’Neill, 1995;
p.265)
Phrases such as “have a particular item in mind” are also common characterizations of
the general concept of “known-item search”. When Wildemuth and O’Neill go on to say
“Such a person would conduct a known-item search. A known-item search may include the
author, the title, the subject, or a combination of these and other pieces of information”, it
seems unclear whether they intend to say that some particular search strategy
implements the “known-item search” or whether the strategy is the search itself. The
ambiguity is perhaps unresolveable in virtue of the tight focus on the context of using a
card catalog or OPAC. But one may still ask: would Wildemuth and O’Neill consider it a
known-item search if the patron used some unanticipated search strategy to find the
entity in mind?
Exploring the Assumptions
We now attempt to identify the specific conditions that seem to be understood by LIS
researchers as constituent of known-item search. Here our principal focus is on the
characterization of the concept, rather than operationalizations of that characterization, or
descriptions of how known-item searches are usually carried out. However we attend to
both and note that they are often blended or conflated in ways difficult to untangle. At this
time we do not assume any particular theory of what a conceptual characterization is, or
should be. Rather we simply explore what information scientists have said and assumed
about known-item search, clarifying and comparing their characterizations and testing
them against intuitions about cases.
Is a Special Epistemic Relationship Required?
The most prominent feature of definitions of known-item search is the requirement that
the user is searching for a “known” object or an object “known to exist”. In the next section
we will take up this requirement in its most general form. In this section we discuss a
more restrictive variant: that the user has a distinctly close relationship to the object
sought, one closer than simply knowing it exists.
This requirement is suggested by the use of words like “exact” or “specific” or “particular”
in phrases like “seeking a specific known item”. These may be redundant adjectives of
course, but we think that their prevalence and similarity suggest that they are not
redundant, but that they are being used to express, however vaguely, an additional
restriction. Moreover there are also other phrases that suggest a particular close
connection with the object, an acquaintance that goes beyond mere knowledge of
existence:
…a specific work which he knows to exist - possibly one with which he has had
previous contact. (Swanson et al., 1968; p.1)
…a situation in which a user is trying to find an item previously read, and
consequently in which the user’s memory of the item is of primary importance. (Allen, 
1989; p.247) 
…to reach a particular site that the user has in mind, either because they visited it in
the past or… (Broder, 2002; p.5)
Here we see specific references to the kinds of close contact the user may have had with
the item (“previously read”, “visited it in the past”), and the kind of current
cognitive/epistemic relationship he may have (the “user’s memory of the item”).
Is something more than mere knowledge required and if so what would that be? We
present two cases that suggest competing intuitions. 
Case 1: In support of the claim that a special relationship is required, consider the
situation where someone goes looking for a textbook on differential equations, justifiably
sure (as we all are) that there are some, but the user has no specific memory of ever
having actually seen such a textbook, or seen a citation to one, or heard a particular
edition mentioned. In such a situation we would be reluctant to say that the user has a
“specific known entity in mind” (an exemplary characterization of known-item search),
even though we would probably say that they are “looking for something that they know
exists”.
Case 2: Against the claim that a special close epistemic relationship to the object is
required, consider the common situation where someone obtains information about an
item from article citations, or from a class reading list, or from a colleague and on that
basis begins looking for the item. These would seem to be unexceptional known-item
searches, and yet the user’s relationship to the object is hardly close.
Is Knowledge Required? 
Now we turn to whether knowledge of the item sought is required at all, in any sense. This
may seem an odd question, since references to knowledge of the item sought are so
prominently mentioned in characterizations of known-item search, but it is nevertheless
quite possible that literal interpretations of these informal characterizations do not
accurately capture the concept we have in mind. And it is also possible that the
psychological effect of these phrases has prevented us from seeing just how little
knowledge has to do with known-item search.
Traditionally in epistemology there are three conditions for knowledge: (i) the knower has
the appropriate belief; (ii) the knower is justified in this belief; (iii) the belief is true. We
take up each one in turn, considering them as possible individual requirements for
known-item search. If any one of them is not a requirement, then knowledge is not a
requirement. 
Is Existence of the Sought Item Required?
Here we have thrown doubt on whether the existence of the object is required and
therefore whether knowledge is required. But we may also wonder whether existence is
required even if knowledge is not. It might be that knowledge is not required because we
do not require the user to have that high level of justification for their belief, but
nevertheless we do expect them to be searching for something that exists.
Consider the case of a citation that despite appearances does not refer to an actual
article. To avoid difficult cases, imagine that the citation is deliberately concocted, but
located in a scientific article in a respected journal and with no hints of playfulness or any
other reason to believe the citation is not authentic. Consider now the innocent (duped)
user searching for this item. Doesn’t that appear to be a known-item search? But because
there is no item to be found, there is no item “known to exist”.
One possible explanation for why our intuitions are indifferent to the existence of the item
would be that our concept of known-item search is wholly about the state of mind of the 
user, and has no dependency on the external world. This is in fact suggested, indirectly, by
Bates when she writes:
The user's experience is phenomenologically different from the indexer's experience.
The user's task is to describe something that, by definition, he or she does not know
(cf. Belkin, 1982). (Knowledge specifically of what is wanted would lead to a
"known-item" search.) (Bates, 1998; p.1186)
Just as Bates spoke of a “phenomenological” difference between the indexer’s and user’s
experience, we might say that there is phenomenological similarity (in all relevant
respects) between the experience of someone looking for the referent of a genuine
veridical citation and someone looking for the referent of a concocted citation. Seeing
known-item search as being only about the cognitive state of the user is consistent with its
actual role in research in information seeking where its explanatory function is always
vis-à-vis the user’s beliefs and never turns on external facts about the search environment
except insofar as they are manifest themselves in the user’s experience.
We now have competing intuitions: (i) known-item search requires a known item; and (ii)
known-item search is a characteristic of the user’s cognitive state, of the user’s
phenomenologically identified experience, and does not depend on any external facts
about the world. There are tradeoffs in each case. If we prefer the first then we seem to
allow that at least one intrinsic characteristic of the concept is actually irrelevant to any
explanatory role that it has in cognition and behavior, and we will in fact lose some of the
explanatory power of the concept of known-item search: it will not collect cases that are
behaviorally indistinguishable from others. But if we prefer the second then we must
revise our terminology and most importantly, give some account of what it is that is 
required and which we attempted to capture with the (misconceived) knowledge
requirement. 
The natural move of course is to reduce the burden of the knowledge requirement to
specifying only that the user believes they know that the object exists, but not require that
they actually do know. This reflects both the sense that something related to knowledge of
the object is required, as well as the intuition that only the phenomenologically identified
cognitive state is relevant. 
Is a Justified Belief that the Sought Item Exists Required?
We examine this weaker requirement, that only belief is required, in two versions. The
weakest version of this weak requirement that only belief, not knowledge, is necessary is
that only mere belief is necessary. We take that version up in the next section. The
stronger version of the weak requirement that only belief, not knowledge, is necessary is
the claim that a justified belief is necessary. We take that up here.
In the counterexample of the previous section the user’s belief that the referent of the
citation existed was, given the evidence, quite reasonable. We might say that it was
justified, warranted, appropriate, etc. It may be thought that this is in part what supported
our intuition that despite the belief’s being false the case was still a case of known-item
search.
But is that so? Suppose our user is, at least on this one occasion, being just a bit careless
and overly optimistic. He forms a belief that is not quite warranted given the evidence
(although perhaps almost warranted) to the effect that a bibliographic item exists - and
sets about attempting to find it. Would this be a known-item search? Here again it seems
that, the user’s cognitive state is phenomenologically similar, at least in the relevant
respects, to that of a user who is indeed performing an authentic known-item search. Can
simply a slight misjudgment of the weight of the evidence make the difference between
whether a search is a known-item search or not?
Is Any Belief Required?
If the preceding consideration is persuasive we might retreat to the claim that some belief
in the object’s existence is necessary, but not insist on justified belief. We now examine
this weak version of the weak knowledge requirement.
Consider a case when a user hears about an unlikely entity from a colleague. He conducts
a search for that entity although he does not believe that it can possibly exist, and he
wants to prove that his colleague is wrong. In such a case, is he still conducting a
known-item search even though he does not even believe it exists? At least some
researchers would say so, and regardless of whether the item exists.
For "known item search" … in particular socalled descriptive cataloging data [is]
useful. Bibliographical verification is a process in which libraries search known items.
(Documents to be verified sometimes turn out to be phantoms, cf., Dubin, 2004).
(Hjørland, 2005b)
Apparently the possibility of known-item search where the user has no belief whatsoever
that the object sought exists is consistent with the intuition of some LIS researchers.
Nature of Object Sought
Now we turn to another sort of issue: exactly what sort of object is being sought? As a
source of useful terminology for our discussion we draw on IFLA’s Functional 
Requirements for Bibliographic Records (FRBR), and, specifically, the FRBR Group 1
entities: work, expression, manifestation, and item. Works are characterized by FRBR as
“a distinct intellectual or artistic creation”, expressions as “the intellectual or artistic
realization of a work in the form of alphanumeric, musical, or choreographic notation,
sound, image, object, movement, etc., or any combination of such forms” (a rough
synonym might be text), manifestation as “the physical embodiment of an expression” (an
edition is a manifestation), and items as “a single exemplar of a manifestation” (items are
individual physical copies) (IFLA, 1998). On this account works, expressions, and
manifestations are abstract entities, and items are concrete physical entities. Works are
realized by expressions; expressions embodied in manifestations; and manifestations
exemplified by items - and works are typically realized by multiple expressions,
expressions typically embodied in multiple manifestations, and manifestations typically
exemplified by multiple items. 
Since the term “item” already appears in the phrases associated with our concept of
interest (known-item search), we will to avoid confusion often use the term “copy” to refer
to the FRBR entity “item”, and we will more frequently than elsewhere use the term
“object”, rather than “item” to refer generally to the thing sought.
For now, we assume a user really intends to come into actual possession of an object, and
not simply learn that the object exists in a particular place, such as the library where the
search is being conducted. If we further assume the strict identity of the object that is
sought and the object that comes to be possessed in the case of a successfully concluded
search, it might seem that only a copy (a FRBR “item”) will do as the object sought - as
only the copy is a physical object and could be actually possessed by a user.
But this cannot be the whole story. Users in a rare book library may indeed sometimes
wish to find a particular copy, but others are more likely looking for a particular edition, or
a particular translation, or a particular work. Relevant is Yee and Layne’s revision of
“known-item search” to “known-work search”:
Known-Work Search 
Research has shown that one of the most common searches done by our users is a
known-item search (actually, a search for a particular work, or a known-work search). 
(Yee & Layne, 1998; p.74) 
Indeed it is a commonplace of library science that users sometimes wish to possess a
particular edition, sometimes an edition with a particular translation, and sometimes any
copy of a work. How do we describe these cases? The obvious start is to observe that
although phrases like “looking for a particular edition” are natural enough, “looking for a
copy of a particular edition” is equally natural and better reflects our intuition that only
coming into possession of a physical copy would be a successful search. Now we may feel
we can describe our different cases with somewhat more ontological clarity:
(a) …searching for a particular copy 
(e.g., one desired for its scribal marginalia, provenance, or the passport used as a
bookmark and forgotten). 
(b) …searching for a copy which exemplifies a particular manifestation
(e.g., the 1851 NY Scribner’s edition).
(c) …searching for a copy which exemplifies any manifestation that embodies a
particular expression
(e.g., say the emended text of the 1851 edition).
(d) …searching for a copy which exemplifies any manifestation that embodies any
expression of a particular work
(e.g., Moby Dick).
(We use the FRBR categories only to show how a solution might go, remaining agnostic,
here, as to whether or not FRBR has the framework just right or not.)
The De Re Attribution Assumption
The similarity of phrasing in each case above conceals an interesting difference. In case
(a) it is natural to say about the copy in question that it is being sought. However in case
(b) it does not seem natural to say about any one of the many copies that it is being
sought. After all, which one would it be? And it can’t be all of them since our user wants
just one copy. If this is right, then that someone “seeks a copy which exemplifies a
particular manifestation” does not imply that there actually is a copy which is such that it
is being sought.
Does that mean that in cases (b) through (d) there is something else other than a copy
such that it is being sought? For instance, the manifestation, expression, and work,
respectively for (b)-(d)? Not given our assumptions that (i) what is sought is what is
identical with what is found (when successful) and (ii) what is found is always something
concrete and physical. We must now either revisit those assumptions or give up the
intuition that in at least some known-item searches of types (b)-(d) there is something
about which we can say plausibly “it is sought”.
It might be thought that this is not a problem if we agree that for the reasons argued
earlier existence is not a requirement. However it seems nevertheless plausible that even
if existence is not a general requirement, still, in at least those cases of (b)-(d) searching
where full knowledge of the sought object actually does obtain, there must then be
something about which we can say: it is sought.
In favor of holding that in no case of known-item search (b)-(d) is there anything such that
it is sought, it will inevitably be adduced that Diogenes sought an honest man, Schliemann
the site of Troy, and Ponce de Leon the Fountain of Youth - and in none of these cases is
there something about which we could say “it is sought…”. But the obvious rejoinder is
that even if those are cases of known-item search (which is doubtful), they are not relevant
cases as they are not cases where something known to exist was sought. Rather each
searcher only thought that the thing they sought existed. If we wish to retain any notion
that in some cases of (b)-(d) known-item search there is truly something about which we
can say “it is sought” then we need to solve this problem. If we don’t it will not be clear just
what it means to say even in the case of a known-item search where the knowledge
condition obtains that “a known item is sought”.
Any complete treatment of “known-item” search will need to deal with this difficult
problem. However we will not discuss it further here. It is a familiar problem in
philosophical logic and our examples of seeking nonexistent objects are taken from that
literature.
Types and Accuracy of the Information Known and Used for the Search
In the 1876 edition of Cutter’s Rules for a Printed Dictionary Catalogue (p.10), we find that
the first objective of a catalog is “1. To enable a person to find a book of which either (A)
the author, (B) the title, (C) the subject is known“. It is interesting that an interpretation of
this allows subject as an access point for known-item search. However in the later
literature, “title” and “author” dominate as the major attributes used for conducting a
known-item search, and the mention of “subject” as an access point becomes harder to
find. In some cases, known-item searches are even considered to be equal to the
aggregation of “title” and “author” searches (Cooper & Chen, 2001). However, a few
authors do consider other attributes such as publisher (Swanson, 1972; Hjørland, 1997),
series (Hjørland, 1997), subject (Wildemuth & O’Neill, 1995) as the types of information
used for known-item searches.
As to the accuracy of information used for known-item searches, several studies on
catalog uses found that the user’s information was often incorrect and/or incomplete
(Jackson & American Library Association, 1958; Swanson, 1972; Lewis, 1987; Dwyer et
al., 1991). Thus, it seems reasonable to say that the complete accuracy of information
that the user brings to the search should not be a necessary condition for a known-item
search.
A known-item search occurs when the user has a limited but correct description of an
existing document. The user is sure of the fact that the document exists, that its title
and author are explicitly stated somewhere in the document, and these assumptions
are true to the actual state of the docuverse. (Dahlström & Gunnarsson, 2000)
Dahlstrom and Gunnarsson’s characterization of “the user has a limited but correct
description of an existing document” lets us avoid having an unreasonable assumption
that all of the user’s information must be correct. It is still questionable though: what we
can say about a case in which the user is looking for a book he previously read, but all the 
information he thinks is relevant to finding the item and is attempting to use in his search
is incorrect. Can we still say that the user really knows the item? The user may not be able
to easily initiate the search in the existing system, and perhaps he is unlikely to be
successful, but he may be able to recognize the item and verify it to be the correct item
when he sees it. Except the fact that he does not really know any useful correct
information about the item to use as access points, other conditions (i.e., particular item
in mind, awareness of the existence of the item due to previous contact with it) seem to
suggest that it is most likely to be a known-item search. Does this mean, then, that one
can conduct a known-item search without really mobilizing knowledge of any relevant
attributes of the item? 
Relationship with Other Types of Searches
Traditionally, there is a strong dichotomous view of distinguishing between known-item
searches and subject searches (Buckland, 1979). However, the blurriness of this boundary
is mentioned by several authors and noted in various studies.
…even searches which began as known-item searches became subject searches, the
known-item being the user’s access point to that subject (Hancock-Beaulieu, 1990).
(Brinkley & Burke, 1995; p.4)
In other words a “known item” search may, in fact, be an indirect and disguised
“subject” search for specific information not necessarily unique to the document
used. (Buckland, 1979; p.145)
…however, some known-item searches are subject searches with the known item
used as an entry into a subject area. (Lewis, 1987; p.153)
Buckland’s comment that a known-item search “may, in fact be an indirect and disguised
‘subject’ search” is now a common observation (also found in Lewis, 1987; Brinkley &
Burke, 1995) alluding to situations such as these: (i) the user looks for an item known to
exist in order to get the subject descriptors; (ii) the user searches on keywords in the title
field to locate items on a subject; or (iii) the user searches on an author anticipating, but
not necessarily knowing that that author has written books on a particular subject. Given
our agenda however we need to ask what the statement “may in fact, be an indirect and
disguised ‘subject’ search” is intended to claim. The rhetoric of “disguise” suggests that
something is not what it seems, but this does not necessarily mean that there is no
known-item search in the cases in question. In case (i) for instance it might be best to say
that there is a known-item search taking place which is part of a subject search. Cases (ii)
and (iii) nicely illustrate the problem of managing conceptual and operational definitions.
If we understand known-item search operationally as a search using author or title fields
then we cannot say that there is any disguise: the searches are known-items searches -
the definition however is a bad one because it is not in the relevant context coextensive
with our conceptual understanding. Cited reference searching is also an interesting
example where the search for a known item (a particular cited reference) is often
interpreted as a form of subject search because the contents of citing articles are likely to
be related to the cited article in some way.
A user searches by subject for the following purposes: (1) to identify or retrieve
specific items of which the subject is known (sometimes referred to as known-item
searching) and (2) to search for information on a given subject. (Chan, 1994; p.155)
Searching for known items by subject is very inefficient, but can be successful when
other approaches fail. (Lewis, 1987; p.153) 
Here, we again see a recognition that some known-item searching may be carried out by
searching under subject. We might say, in fact, that just as some known-item searching
disguises subject searching, some subject searching disguises known-item searching. 
Buckland (1979) also presents a scenario of using the subject catalog when the author
and title are not remembered by the user to illustrate such a case. What is important for
our discussion here though is that in neither case does the search, or at least part of it, fail
to be a known-item search. 
Discussion and Areas for Future Research
Through this paper, we attempted to demonstrate the complexity of the issues in defining
a concept of “known-item search” and explicitly spell out the assumptions in various
characterizations of the concept in the LIS literature. We see this paper as an effort to
initiate a discussion rather than to settle a question, and we hope to have successfully
raised the readers’ awareness of this issue.
We note that this paper is only the first step in a larger project. To truly make substantial
progress on the agenda of increased rigor in the foundation of information science, the
results that we express informally in this paper must be eventually re-expressed in the
common coin of foundational agendas: a simple prose that could uncontroversially be
translated into a formally defined logical notation. That final development will be carried
out in further work.
We also plan more empirical studies of different contexts (web, OPAC, information
retrieval) as well as looking into the case of searching for non-textual items such as
audio/music objects. The nature of encountering music objects is somewhat different
from textual documents. For instance it is not difficult to imagine a situation where the
user gets to know of the existence of a specific piece of music by hearing it but does not
learn of any properties that can help them initiate the search. The user may have some
information about the sought object (e.g., has lyrics “so and so”, fast beat, sad and moody,
used in a car commercial, sounds like artist A), but many of these features are not
represented in bibliographic records and thus cannot be used in an OPAC for searching a
music object. In this case, the users simply do not have enough or the right kind of
information to initiate the search in a typical OPAC, thus those queries, although they
exist, may never appear in the search logs. In our future work, we hope to elaborate the
notion of a known-item search so that we can better understand such cases in our
framework. 
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